

**Can sociophysics becomes
a predictive social tool ?**

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What is SOCIOPHYSICS ?

**It is the use of concepts and techniques
from Statistical Physics to describe
some social and political behaviors**

**It does not aim at an exact
description of the reality but
at singling out some of its
basic mechanics which may
in turn appear be rather
counter intuitive**

Founding papers:

S. Galam, “Entropie, désordre et liberté individuelle”, *Fundamenta Scientiae* 3, 209-213 (1982)

S. Galam, Y. Gefen and Y. Shapir, “Sociophysics: A mean behavior model for the process of strike”, *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 9, 1-13 (1982)

S. Galam, “Physicists as a revolutionary catalyst”, *Fundamenta Scientiae* 1, 351-353 (1980)

S. Galam, “About imperialism of physics”, *Fundamenta Scientiae* 3, 125 (1982)

When
sociophysics
started in the
early eighties
all physicists
dismissed it
strongly as
nonsense

No physical
journal would
accept a related
paper


Such a conference would
be totally unconceivable

Outside physics, the rejection was total including social scientists, politicians and journalists

Indeed to evoke the hypothesis “human could behave, even in part, as atoms” was look upon as an evident absurdity


An unusual review:

S. Galam, “Sociophysics: a personal testimony”, Physica A 336, 49-55 (2004)




Today, sociophysics is a well flourishing field of statistical physics with an increasing number of physicists joining the field and all physical journals now accepting related papers

Every year several conferences include sociophysics topics. Our conference and our action contribute a good deal to the growing of this new field of research



Few social scientists are
starting to get interested
but yet with some doubt
and caution




Journalists are excited
but still often reluctant
to publish associated
view points

S. Galam and S. Moscovici, "Towards a theory of collective phenomena: Consensus and attitude changes in groups", Euro. J. of Social Psy. 21, 49-74 (1991)

What did sociophysics
accomplish so far ?

Several models
have been
elaborated together
with new concepts
and some
numerical
simulations

Some general qualitative
features and new properties
of social systems have been
given enlightening
explanations



Some past political
events have been
given a new
coherent
explanation

For instance




My voting
model was
argued to
provide a key
to understand
last century
communist
parties collapse

Journal of Mathematical
Psychology 30, 426-434 (1986)


Journal of Statistical Physics
61, 943-951 (1990)

Physica A 274, 132-139 (1999)



My contrarian model
was advocated to
explain the fifty-fifty
2000 American and
2002 German
elections

Physica A 333, 453-460 (2004)



The Sznajd
model was
used to
explain 1998
Brazilian
elections

K. Sznajd-Weron and J.
Sznajd, *Int. J. Mod. Phys. C*
11, 1157-1165 (2000)

F. Slanina and H. Lavicka
Eur. Phys. J. B 35 279-288
(2003)

My social
percolation model
proposed some
global framework to
terrorism events like
September 11

S. Galam, Eur. Phys. J. B 26, Rapid Note,
269-272 (2002)

S. Galam and A. Mauger, Physica A 323, 695-
704 (2003)

To come up with an explanation to a past event is nice but not really convincing moreover when a different model is used for each event

One step further was accomplished by predicting some events to occur in the near future but without mentioning a date

For
instance

Using my voting
model, a scenario
for a voting power
taking in France by
the extreme right
party Front
National was
elaborated

No one believed it

Le Monde 1997
“Le dangereux
seuil critique du
FN”

Libération 1998
“Crier, mais
pourquoi?”

In addition

Using my
contrarian model
fifty-fifty
elections were
predicted to
occur again and
to become a
common feature
of western
democracies

cond-mat 2004

Yet no-one would
believes fifty-fifty
elections could
happen again, and
for sure not in the
US, Germany or
Italy where
political issues at
stake were so much
apart

Worthwhile
digression

Physica A
editor M.
Ausloos
showed a
much more
opened mind:


Physica A 333,
453-460 (2004)

The paper first
submitted to
PRL was
withheld by the
editor arguing it
was too political


And what was
predicted did
happen

The Front
National
scenario did
occur in part in
2000 with its
leader running
at the second
run for
president, at the
total surprise of
everyone
including the
FN itself

Fifty-fifty
elections did
occur again in
2005 German
and 2006 Italian
elections against
all polls and
analyst
predictions



It is somehow better BUT yet
not really convincing in
particular towards skeptic
people



No one gave a serious tip to these predictions too busy trying to recover from the psychological and political collapse which resulted from these totally unexpected events

And, even if it sounds nice it is still not quite convincing since neither a date nor a precise location were given

Along the same line of general prediction, using my minority spreading model

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graph TD; A[Along the same line of general prediction, using my minority spreading model] --> B[New general prediction although specific to the possibility of European referendum were made]; B --> C[ ]
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New general prediction although specific to the possibility of European referendum were made


To give some real life illustrations of our model, we can cite events related to the **European Union** which all came as a surprise. From the beginning of its construction there have been **never a large public debate in most of the involved countries**. The whole process came through government decisions though most people always have seemed to agree on this construction. At the same time European **opponents** have been systematically **urging for public debates**. Such a demand sounds like absurd knowing a majority of people favor the European union. But anyhow most European **governments** have been **reluctant to held referendum** on the issue.


At odd, several years ago French president Mitterand decides to **run a referendum** to accept the Maastricht agreement [11]. While a **large success of the Yes** was given for **granted** it indeed made it **just a bit beyond** the required **fifty percent**. The more people were discussing, the less support there was for the proposal. It is even possible to **conjecture** that an **additional two weeks** extension of the public debate would have make the **No to win**.

Applying our results to the **European Union** leads to the conclusion that it would be rather **misleading to initiate large public debates** in most of the involved countries. Indeed, **even starting from a huge initial majority of people in favor of the European Union, an open and free debate would lead to the creation of huge majority hostile to the European Union.** This provides a strong ground to legitimize the on-going reluctance of most European governments to hold referendum on associated issues.

Physica A 336, 56 – 62 (**2004**)

When these
statements were
made no
referendum was
planned



The model in
short 


A simple illustration to
implement the dynamics and
show how the model works

Indeed the mechanisms
involved are universal
and apply to all public
issues

A population of 33 persons
with 22 ■ in favor of the
reform and 11 ■ against it

Day “1” morning

**People on their
own**




The same people at lunch

22 ■ in favor and 11 ■ against

Day "1" lunch


They are discussing




Lunch is over

20 ■ in favor and 13 ■ against

Day "1" end of lunch



Day "1" afternoon




People on their own

Dinner time

20 ■ in favor and 13 ■ against

Day "1" dinner




They are discussing

Usually group compositions are different

Dinner is over

14 ■ in favor and 19 ■ against


Day "1" end of dinner



One day later

Day "2" morning

People on their
own




Lunch time

14 ■ in favor and 19 ■ against

Day "2" lunch

They are discussing


Usually group compositions are not too different



Lunch is over

0 ■ in favor and 33 ■ against


Day "2" end of lunch



A population of 33 persons with
an unanimity against the reform

Day "2" afternoon

**The person
in charge of
the reform
is dismissed**



At the end of 2004
in France, Chirac
decided to hold a
referendum to adopt
the project of
European
constitution

That was the
opportunity to make
a well defined and
precise prediction


Indeed if it is nice to
produce explanations
of past opinion
formation issues


and

sociophysics can do it

It would be much
convincing to
predict an outcome
of some opinion
issue

Apply my
opinion model
to predict the
referendum
outcome





The polls were giving 30% to
the No and 70% to the Yes

The Yes was given
winner by everyone,
including the No
people

The unique issue was the rate of
participation to the vote, many
abstentions being feared


In the mean
time I was able
to introduce
the existence
of
heterogeneous
beliefs to make
the minority
opinion
spreading
model
applicable to
more fuzzy
issues with
different
subpopulations

Phys. Rev.
E **71**,
046123
(2005)

I then made the
analysis using
rudimentary
investigation and
talking to many
people

My conclusion was that
the critical threshold for
the No to start to inflate
from the public debate
was located in the
vicinity of 15%

And that a long time
would be needed to
have the No passing
over 50%



The No was scoring
around 15%

And

There was five
months of debate
ahead of the vote

THEREFORE

given the current conditions of the
debate, the No would win

And indeed
the polls
were giving
15% to the
No and the
debate will
hold for
five months


The conclusion from the
model was thus that
within the current
conditions of the debate
the No will eventually
win the vote

That was nice and
clear, the only problem
was that...

A huge majority of people
were in favor of the Yes,
almost all political leaders
were in favor of the Yes,
France could not say No to
Europe

The only problem at
that time was that
I could not believed it

The BIG problem
was that such a
prediction was
totally ABSURD



The No was scoring
only 30-35%

And

No one could
imagine France
saying No to
Europe


When the journalist
from Le Monde made
the interview, I was a
bit dubitative

At the end it told me
“are you sure you want
to have your conclusion
printed so clearly, your
theory is nice but the
conclusion in non-sense,
you will lose all
credibility for the
future...”

Why to run to shout to
millions of people I am
a fool, moreover
providing the printed
proof of it




As the
journalist
told me
“printed
matter last
for very
long and
will be
used
whenever
necessary
against
your
approach”



Why to
announce a
result I
myself
don't
believe in?

For a minute
I got scared



But then I realized that all
that was about the very core
of the sociophysics
challenge:

not trying to win a
reputation but to build a
robust theory of social
behavior based on a
scientific procedure

Not a personal issue

It the
prediction
turns right it
validates the
model if not
the model has
to be modified


Les mathématiques s'invitent dans le débat européen

« LE "NON" au traité constitutionnel européen va l'emporter... Je le crains. » L'homme qui formule ce pronostic n'est pas un politologue, ne dirige pas un institut de sondages et ne lit pas davantage dans une boule de cristal. Il est chercheur et utilise, pour tout outil de travail, des modèles mathématiques.

Serge Galam, physicien de formation, spécialiste des théories du désordre, œuvre au rapprochement de sa discipline d'origine et des sciences humaines au sein du Centre de recherche en épistémologie appliquée (Ecole polytechnique-CNRS) de Paris. Ce « sociophysicien » s'intéresse, en particulier, aux mouvements d'opinion (*Le Monde* du 28 mars 2000).

L'un de ses modèles, décrivant « la propagation d'opinions minoritaires en milieu démocratique », s'applique, comme un gant, au référendum sur la Constitution de l'Europe. Il montre comment le « non », aujourd'hui minoritaire dans les sondages, est en mesure, d'un strict point de vue mathématique, de s'imposer finalement.

Le chercheur considère une population devant effectuer un choix simple entre deux possibilités : oui ou non, pour ou contre, A ou B... Il pos-



Au terme d'un seul cycle de discussion, 25 « oui » et 12 « non » peuvent se transformer en 20 « non » et 17 « oui ».

l'emporterait jamais. Et que, dans le cas le plus fréquent où une opinion prime au départ, celle-ci finit tôt ou tard, compte tenu des règles imposées au modèle, par recueillir tous les suffrages.

Même sur le papier, les choses ne sont bien sûr pas si simples. Serge Galam introduit dans ses équations un paramètre très humain : la part du doute. Celui-ci n'entre pas en jeu

cas, suppose le chercheur, le groupe finit également par adopter une position commune (2 oui et 2 non donneront 4 oui ou 4 non), mais en se déterminant en fonction de « représentations sociales, culturelles ou idéologiques » ne relevant pas toujours de la question posée proprement dite.

« En cas de doute, précise Serge Galam, c'est l'opinion la plus proche

ple, faire pencher la balance « la croyance que ce traité signera la perte de la souveraineté nationale » ou celle, pourtant dénuée de fondement, que « sa ratification entraînera l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Europe ».


EN TACHE D'HUILE

Tout l'intérêt du modèle est de mettre en évidence comment, de


sant que, sur 100 Français, 70 sont au départ favorables au « oui » au référendum, ils ne sont plus que 67 après le premier round de discussion, 63 après le deuxième, puis, la machine s'emballant, 56, 45, 30, 12, 2 et, pour finir, 0. Quatre cycles suffisent pour rendre le « oui » minoritaire, et huit pour l'éliminer complètement. Il faudrait que les partisans du « oui » soient 80 pour qu'ils finissent par convaincre les 20 défenseurs du « non », au bout de quatorze cycles de discussion.

Un tel scénario, qui réduit à néant une opinion au départ largement majoritaire, n'est évidemment guère vraisemblable. Cette construction arithmétique a en effet ses limites. Elle ne tient pas compte, en particulier, de tous les facteurs externes – interventions politiques, campagnes médiatiques, conjoncture économique, tensions internationales... – qui, dans la réalité, peuvent influencer l'opinion publique.

Les responsables politiques militant pour le « oui » au référendum pourraient néanmoins en tirer un enseignement, suggère, en chercheur-citoyen, Serge Galam. Puisque le « non » risque de prospérer sur la défense du statu quo, il leur faut convaincre les Français que ce




In may 29, 2005 the
No won the vote at
55%




It was the first time
that a political vote
outcome was predicted
using a model from
sociophysicis




Moreover it was
highly improbable



Up to the last minute
no-one among analysts
could believe it will
happen




In addition the
prediction was made
several months ahead
of the actual vote
against all polls and
predictions



It was not a tail
to head chance

It was even
not a
random
selection
with a low
probability



It was up to
few weeks
ahead of the
vote a zero
probability
event

Of course it
does not means
the model is
correct


But it validates
the model and
the approach in
a way to prove
that
sociophysics
may become in
the near future a
real predictive
tool

This will
have drastic
consequences
on political
life

No one is
prepared to
such a
possibility

But hold on

To conclude,



We are on the
right track but
yet only at the
very beginning

...

much work
and checks
have still to
be made